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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROY S. LUDLOW INVESTMENT COMPANY/
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

1

SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants, i
CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS
CORPORATION OF DELAWARE,

Case No. 14253

]
]

Plaintiff in
Intervention,
\

vs.

• . -r

SALT LAKE COUNTY,
\
]

Defendant in
Intervention.

_

]

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
ROY S. LUDLOW INVESTMENT COMPANY
NATURE OF CASE

The nature of case as stated by Appellant is excepted
to in the following particular:

that trial on all aspects of

the case was not held at the time of the first trial of this
matter but only the issue of whether or not the land in question
belonged to the Respondent and that judgment was rendered only
on the issue of land ownership.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the judgment
rendered in its favor as against the Appellant.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.,. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent takes exception to the statement of facts
as set forth by Appellant.
Respondent sought to abate a nuisance created by the
County in the construction of a road.

Paragraph 10 of its

Complaint (R-3) states:
"That said defendant has and is trespassing
upon plaintiff*s property and has and is
creating a public way across plaintiff's
property and as such has created a nuisance,
which nuisance should be abated and defendant
restrained and enjoined from further and
creating said nuisance."
That the issues tried by the Court on the 19th day
of May, 1971, the time of the first trial in this matter, was
to determine whether or not 3200 West was a public road and
whether or not a resolution passed by the Salt Lake County Board
of Commissioners on the 25th day of November, 1959, to abandon
the public streets in what was formerly known as Mountain View
Subdivision was proper.

(R-110-111)

It was stipulated by all

of the parties to the action that in the event that the issues
tried were determined in favor of the Respondent and against
Salt Lake County the Respondent would not close off or otherwise
disturb the flow of traffic or the useage of the rights of way
claimed by other parties until final adjudication of the matter
including the contemplated condemnation action or until further
order of the Court.

(R-lll)

The County had represented to all

concerned that in the event that the issues were found in favor
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of plaintiff an action for condemnation would be commenced by
the County to acquire the road in question.

Following the

Appeal by the Appellant to the Supreme Court and the rendition
of the Supreme Court of its decision in favor of the Respondent
(28 U.2d 139, 499 P.2d 283), the Appellant did nothing and in fact
refused to bring an action to condemn the property.

Thereafter on

the 6th day of October, 1972, Respondent filed a Motion for an
Order permitting it to close the roadway, (R-266-267) which
matter was set for hearing by the Court on the 18th day of
October, 1972, at the hour of nine o'clock a.m.

On that date

at approximately eight o'clock a.m., one hour before the scheduled
hearing on the Motion of the Respondent to allow it to close the
roadway, Salt Lake County moved heavy equipment onto the property
in question and destroyed the existing roadway.
Thereafter on the 12th day of December, 1972, the
Respondent filed a claim against Salt Lake County under the
Governmental Immunity Act seeking damages for the destruction
of the road, which Respondent claimed was its property.
232)

(R-231-

This claim was rejected by the County on January 8, 1973,

(R-234) thereafter Respondent filed a Motion to File an Amended
Complaint which the Court authorized Respondent to file (R-235)
after a hearing.
Trial was thereafter had on the Supplemental Complaint
and at the conclusion of the Respondent's case the Appellant
-3-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

moved to dismiss the Supplemental Complaint on the grounds
that what had occurred was an intentional trespass by the County
and that an action for an intentional trespass was not waived
under the Governmental Immunity Act.

(R-260-261)

The trial

court denied the Motion and rendered judgment for the Respondent.
From this Judgment Appellant appeals.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT REMOVAL OF ROAD WAS A DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION IS NOT FOUNDED UPON THE LAW.
In Point I of Appellant's argument the County seeks to
set up a defense that the claim for damages was not waived under
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and cites therefore the
proposition that the removal of the road was a discretionary
function of government.

It cites therefore the proposition

that because the County Commissioners met with the County Attorney
and decided to remove the road that this was a discretionary
function.
Under State Statute the County Commission could only
come to decisions with respect to governmental policy or functioning at general or special meetings.
Commissioner McClure testified in his deposition that
this was a special meeting of the County Commissioners (TRMcClure-22).

Commissioner McClure admitted that no minutes of

this meeting were kept.

(TR-McClure-19)
-4-
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Pursuant to 17-5-7, UCA 1953 a special meeting of the
County Commission may be ordered by a majority of the Board or
the Chairman, however, the order must be signed by the members
or the Chairman calling the meeting and the order must be entered
on the minutes of the Board.
Pursuant to 17-5-15, UCA 1953 the County Clerk must
record all proceedings of the County Commission's meetings.
Pursuant to 17-5-16, UCA 1953 the Board must cause to be kept a
minute book in which must be recorded all orders and decisions
made by the Board and the daily proceedings had at all regular
and special meetings.

This was not done in the instance of the

Commission reaching a decision to remove the road.
The County Commission's failure to comply with State
Law with respect to arriving at the decision to remove this
road can hardly te said to be a discretionary function on behalf
of the Commission.

Commissioner McClure in his deposition

stated that the decision to remove the road was not at a formal
Commission meeting, although he deemed it not to be an executive
session of the Commission as anyone could have attended if they
wanted to. No minutes were kept.

(TR-McClure-18-19)

Assuming for the moment that the decision of the
County Commission was, as the Appellant urges, a basic policy
decision, still the fact that the County's employees trespassed
and destroyed property in carrying out this policy is the ministerial implementation of the basic policy and as such does not
have the cloak of immunity.
-5-
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In the case of Johnson vs. State, 73 Ca. Rptr. 240,
447 P.2d 352, a case cited as authority by the Supreme Court of
Utah in Carroll vs. State of Utah, 27 U.2d 384, 496 P.2d 888,
the California Appellant Court observed:
"These cited cases establish the principal
that, although a basic policy decision (such
as standards for parole) may be discretionary
and hence warrant Governmental Immunity, subsequent ministerial actions in the implementation of
that basic decision still must face case by
case adjudication on the question of negligence."
The trial court found that the County through its
County Employees was negligent in failing to ascertain who, as
a matter of law, was the owner of the roadway that they intended
to destroy and that they negligently destroyed the roadway which
was as a matter of law the property of the plaintiff.

This was

done on the operational level of government, that is, at the
level of the County Road and Bridges and its employees who
trespassed upon the property of the Respondent to destroy the
roadway.

(R-2 67)

The Court further found that destruction of

the Respondent's property was not the exercise or the performance
of a discretionary function.

(R-2 67)

The discretionary function, if any, was the decision
of the County Commissioners to construct a new roadway adjoining
the existing road and the general determination to remove the
old roadway.

(TR-McClure-15)

A new road was constructed

abutting on the west edge of Respondent's property - a lateral
move of 33 feet to the west.
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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How the old roadway was to be in fact removed or
destroyed became an operational function of government.

That

is, the securing of permission to enter onto land of another
and permission to remove the roadway, the property of another.
This, the County through its employees negligently failed to do.
The Supreme Court of Utah had put the County on notice
that the land in question was the land of the Respondent.
Therefore, the entry upon that land for the purposes of removing
property thereon was cleanly a trespass.

The failure of the

County Commission to find out, through its employees who in fact
owned the roadway was a negligent act on the operational level
again.

It cannot be said to be discretionary as to who owned

the roadway or to find out who owned the roadway.

Certainly it

is discretionary to find out what your legal rights are, but then
anything that one does contains certain elements of discretion.
Carroll vs. State Road Commission, (op cit.).

The failure to

ascertain who the owner was or the failure to obtain permission
to enter onto property of someone else was negligence on the
operational level.
It has been pointed out in numerous cases that for a
decision to be discretionary it is necessary for the decision
to involve a "basic governmental policy, program or objective".
King vs. City of Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 239, 525 P.2d228, 232. It
is submitted that one of the functions of County Government is
to supply roadways within the County.

Supplying the roadways

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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does not entail the trespassing upon property of another and the
destruction of property, located thereon.

In the instant case

it may well be said that the County did have the discretionary
function as to whether or not to construct a new roadway adjacent
to the land of the Respondent, but it can hardly to said that
the discretionary function went to the entry upon the land of
the Respondent to destroy a roadway located thereon.

As stated

in the King vs. City of Seattle, case (op cit.) at p. 233 of
Pacific citation:
"Immunity for'discretionary activities' serves
no purpose except to assure that courts refuse
to pass judgment on policy decisions in the
province of coordinate branches of government.
Accordingly, to be entitled to immunity the
State must make a showing that such a policy
decision consciously blancing risks and
advantages took place. The fact that an employee
normally engages in 'discretionary activity'
is irrelevant if, in a given case the employee
did not render a considered decision."
In applying a standard of a consciously balancing
risk and advantages one has to ask in the instant case just what
risks and advantages were balanced by the Salt Lake County
Commission in determining to trespass upon the land of the
Respondent and remove a roadway which they had constructed
some years previously.

This served no usefull purpose whatso-

ever so far as Salt Lake County Government was concerned in
that under the law and the findings of the Court, the roadway
belonged to the Respondent.

There was no showing that it was

necessary to remove this road before a new roadway could be
constructed.

There was no showing that the Salt Lake County

Attorney's Office had advised the Appellant as to the possibilities
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of further damage by the trespass onto the property of the
Respondent to remove the roadway or to the determination as to
just who the roadway belonged to in the first place.
In the King vs. City of Seattle case ( op cit.) it
was found that the City acting through its Board of Public Works
acted arbitrarily and capriciously and without foundation in
law and that such conduct could not be asserted as discretionary
function of Government.

This is the same situation as we have

in the instant case although the Court did not find that the
actions of Salt Lake County were arbitrary or capricious. However , the County does assert, although it is careful in its
language to play down that it "intentionally trespassed" upon
the land of the Respondent, which would bring it within the
realm of an arbitrary and capricious act, still the County does
fall back to this proposition on page 6 of their brief.
The case law of Utah has cited with approval the
California cases, which cases were likewise cited with approval
in the Washington case of King vs. City of Seattle, (op cit.).
It is submitted that under no stretch of the imagination could
the acts of Salt Lake County be deemed to be discretionary in
the facts of this case.
How "considered" could the determination of the Salt
Lake County Commission have been when it did not even follow
the statutory commandment that minutes of its meeting would be
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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duly recorded.

The decision was of such a nature as it did not

want to have the public know that it had considered the invasion
of a person's property and the destruction of property as a
discretionary function of local government.
POINT II
THE ACTIONS OF THE APPELLANT'S AGENTS WERE NEGLIGENT IN DESTROYINT RESPONDENT'S PROPERTY.
Appellant asserts as its second defense to the actions
of its agents and employees that their conduct was intentional
and that therefore this falls within the exclusions of the
Governmental Immunity Act (63-30-11 (2) UCA 1953, as amended).
The law of Utah, which needs no citation of authority,
is that the findings of fact of the trial court will not be
disturbed unless there is no creditable evidence upon which such
findings could be predicated.
In the instant case the trial court in its Memorandum
Decision(R-260-261) found that the actions of the Appellant
was an act of negligence and was not a willfull prespass.

The

Court in its findings of fact and conclusions of law (R-265-268)
specifically spelled out that the acts of the Appellant were
founded on negligence and not willfull trespass.

In the

deposition of Commissioner McClure (TR-McClure-12-12) the Commissioner admits that nothing was mentioned by the County Attorney
at the time of the meeting with the three County Commissioners
that the roadway in fact belonged to the Respondent.
-10-
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This was

negligence on the part of the County Attorney in not properly
advising the Commissioners as to just who in fact owned the roadwa
The law in Utah is clear that buildings or other structures
placed on or affixed to the soil become part of the land and
belong to its owner,

Reimann vs. Baumy 115 U. 147, 203 P.2d 387,

41 Am Jur 2d 480, Improvements, §2. See also annotation 130 ALR
1034, Property Rights in Respect of Building, or Other Structures
Placed Upon Anothers Land Through Mistake as to Boundary or
Location,
It is submitted that the Salt Lake County Attorney
should have been aware of the Occupying Claimants Act, 57-6-1,
UCA 1953.

It is admitted by Appellant that it did not seek to

avail itself of the Occupying Claimants Act but proceeded forward
to carve out its own remedies in spite of the law.

It is

submitted, and the trial court so found, that such conduct was
negligence.
POINT III
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT UNDER THE DEFENSE OF INTENTIONAL TRESPASS
WOULD DEPRIVE RESPONDENT OF EQUAL PROTECTIONS OF THE LAW.
Appellant falls back on the time honored defense of
Governmental Immunity in seeking a reversal of this matter on
the theory that the actions of the Appellant were either discretionary functions or were a intentional trespass.
With respect to the defense of the intentional trespass
it is submitted that if the government is entitled to take a
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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person's property, destroy the same and to deprive the lawful
owner thereof of its use and enjoyment that such action is
unconstitutional as it violates the Equal Protections Clause of
§1 14th Amendment, Constitution of the United States.
The Constitution provided:
"No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
The Governmental Immunity Act, 63-30-11 (2) provided that the
Government is immune for its actions done intentionally, i.e.
intentional trespass but that if the action done is done
negligently then the government stands liable for such negligent conduct.
A citizen who is agrieved by the actions of a governmental agency, if that agency acts negligently, has recourse
to the Courts.

On the other hand if that same governmental

agency acts intentionally the agrieved person has no redress to
the Courts. Therefore, it is submitted, it is clear and without
plausible argument, that certain classes of persons have been
denied "equal protections" that is, they may not have their
wrongs redressed in courts because "governmental immunity"
has not been waived as to them although governmental immunity
has been waived as to other classes and persons.
The net effect of the governmental immunity act of
Utah is that certain citizens have been denied access to the
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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courts for redress of their wrongs.

This in and of itself is

a violation of Article 1 §11 Constitution of Utah which states:
"All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person, property
or reputation shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial
or unnecessary delay."
Since the beginning of our country, the ancient and
"venerable" Doctrine of Governmental Immunity has plagued the
individual citizen with respect to the redressing of his rights
and grievances against an offending government.

In using the

word "venerable" the writer of this brief uses the same with
tongue in cheek as the doctrine is outdated, tyrannical and
not predicated upon sound principles of justice in a modern
society.
Utah in its case decisions has consistently followed
the Doctrine of Governmental Immunity.

In the case of Cobia vs.

Roy City, 12 U.2d, 375, 366 P.2d 986, at footnote 1 thereof the
cases in which adopt and follow governmental immunity are
annotated.

Utah in following the Doctrine of Governmental

Immunity has failed to keep pace with the times. The reason for
following Governmental Immunity was set forth in the case of
Bingham vs. Board of Education of Ogden City, 118 U. 582, 223 P.2d
432, wherein Justice Latimer stated:
"While law writers, editors and judges
have criticized and disapproved the foregoing
»13-
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T

Doctrine of Governmental Immunity as illogical
and unjust the weight of precedent of decided
cases supports the general rule and we prefer
not to disregard a principle so well established
without statutory authority. We therefore,
adopt the rule of the majority and hold that
school boards can not be held liable for ordinary
negligent acts."
It is submitted that the weight of authority no longer

preponderates towards the maintenance of the Doctrine of
Governmental Immunity.

The following are but few of the more

modern well reasoned, rational and equitable minded cases which
have held that Governmental Immunity does not serve the purposes
for which it was originally intended nor does it amorleate the
unjust treatment of citizens.

Hargrove vs. Coco Beach, (1957

Fla.) 96 S.2d 130, 50 ALR 2d 1193; Friedman vs. Farmington Township
School District, 40 Mich. App. 197, 198 N.W. 2d 785, Reich vs.
State Highway Department, 170 N.W. 2d 267, Zipster vs. Pound,
(1972) 67 Misc 152, 329 N.Y.2d 494; Ayala vs. Philadelphia Board
of Education, 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877; Kitto vs. Minota Park
District, (1974) 224 N.W.2d 795; Barker vs. City of Santa Fe,
47 N.M. 85, 136 P.2d 480; Long vs. City of Weirton, et al.,
(1975 W.Va.)

S.E.2d

(1974 N.H.) 322 A.2d 378.

Merrill vs. City of Manchester,
Governmental Immunity has been struck

down or given only limited existence in decisions from California,
Idaho, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Hawaii, West Virginia, Kansas and other states.
-14-
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A justification giving the government the right to
intentionally trespass upon ones property with immunity is to
vest the government with such powers that no modern logical
mind could justify such action under the constitution of either
the United States or of Utah.
The trial courd did not find it necessary to determine
the constitutionality of the Governmental Immunity Act by its
findings that the actions of the Appellant were negligent and
not intentional.

However, if the court should find the conduct

of the Appellant intentional then such conduct is unconstitutional.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING THE
FILING OF A SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT.
Under Rule 15 (d) U.R.C.P., it is provided that a
party upon notice may file a supplemental proceeding "setting
forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened
since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented".
The facts of this case are that the County after the
Supreme Court of Utah had ruled in the first appeal of this
matter that the County had trespassed it then once again entered
onto the property of the Respondent and destroyed property
located thereon.

This is just what Rule 15 (d) is all about.

Appellant in its brief seems to state that supplemental
proceedings are not allowed to reopen a case.
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the instant

case there was never an adjudication of all of the rights of
the parties. The only issue tried to the trial court at the
time of the first trial was whether or not the land in question
belonged to the County or to the Respondent.

It was stipulated

by the parties in the pre-trial order (R-ll) that if the issue
to be tried of who owned the roa

in question was decided in

favor of the plaintiff it would not close off or otherwise disturb
the flow of traffic or the useage of the rights of way claimed
by the other parties nor in any way interfer with the utilities
located on the right of way until "final adjudication of the
matter, including the contemplated condemnation action or until
further order of the Court, the plaintiff not waiving any claims
or rights for the continued useage of the road by the parties".
Such a stipulation can hardly be said to be a final adjudication
of the case when it went to the Supreme Court and that the
decision thereon closed the case.

The conduct of the Appellant

in further trespassing upon the land of the Respondent and the
destruction of property located thereon is a proper subject
matter of a Supplemental Complaint pursuant to Rule 15 (d) U.R.C.P.
POINT V
RESPONDENT IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING DAMAGES FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF ITS PROPERTY.
Appellant seeks to foreclose Respondent from obtaining
damages on the theory of its "self help".

Self help being in the

instant case its unilateral decision to enter onto the property
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of the Respondent and to destroy improvements belonging to the
Respondent, located thereon.

It is interesting to note that

this destruction took place one-half hour before the Court was
to hear Respondent's Motion For an Order allowing Respondent to
close off said roadway.

This was not a Motion to Remove the

road but a Motion to Allow Respondent to close the road, the
Respondent having asserted and having been adjudicated the owner
of the roadway in question.

Point III of Appellant's brief is

without merit.
POINT VI
SALT LAKE COUNTY DID NOT HAVE EQUITABLE RIGHT IN THE ROAD IN
QUESTION.
In Point IV of Appellant's brief the County seeks to
assert that it had an equitable right in the road.

The County

then takes the inconsistent position that it failed to avail
itself of its remedies under 57-6-1, et seq. UCA 1953. Under
the law this was the County's sole remedy.

It elected not to

avail itself of the law or, conversely Salt Lake County's
Attorneys Office was negligent in not advising the County
Commissioners of the availability of this law.
seeks equity.
matter.

Now the County

The Doctrine of Clean Hands is applicable in this

The old saying those who seek equity must do equity

certainly has applicability in the instant case where the County
deliberately built a road on property belonging to the Respondent,
even though the Respondent advised the Appellant not to build
the road that the Appellant then entered onto the property of
-17-
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the Respondent and destroyed the road even after having been
advised to stop such destruction.

(R-297)

The County now as a

means of attempting to get out of its legal responsibilities
attempts to invoke the Doctrine of Governmental Immunity claiming
discretionary function or intentional trespass.
Does the County seek equity?

Is this equity?

Has the County done equity?

Appellant's Point IV of its brief is without merit.
POINT VII
THE DAMAGES AWARDED WERE NOT EXCESSIVE OR IMPROPERLY MEASURED.
Appellant did not cross examine Respondent's witnesses
nor did Appellant seek to show through its own evidence the
measure of damages.
The Court, based upon the evidence adduced at the trial
properly assessed damages based on the evidence before it.
Such an assessment was not arbitrary or beyond what reasonable
minds would accept.

DeVos vs. Noble, 13 U.2d 133, 369 P.2d 290,

Cert Den. 83 S.Ct. 37, 371 U.S. 821, 9 L.Ed. 2d 61; Super Tire
Market, Inc., vs. Rollings, 18 U.2d 122, 417 P.2d 132.
Arnold Machinery Company vs. Intrusion Prepakt, Inc.,
11 U.2d 246, 357 P.2d 496, Cottrell vs. Grand Union Tea Company,
5 U.2d 187, 299 P.2d 622.
SUMMARY
It is respectfully submitted that the Respondent is
entitled to the damages awarded by the trial Court.

It is further

respectfully submitted that this case stands as a hall mark of
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

arbitrary, capricious governmental intermeddling with the rights
of its citizens.

The Respondent was put to the task of going

through a trial, and appeal to assert ownership of its lands,
and to demonstrate the trespass of the Appellant.

Following this,

the Appellant, again seeking self help refused to condemn the
land of the Respondent that it had taken and then negligently
set about to again trespass upon the land and to destroy Respondent's property without availing itself of the Courts and the
normal judicial process by which the rest of the citizens of
the state are governed.
The trial court did not err in granting to Respondent
fair and just damages for the destruction of its property.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

PAUL N. COTRO-MANES
Attorney for Plaintiff-Responde
Roy S. Ludlow Investment Compan
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